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IN THE SllPREME COURT OF THE STATE: OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
- '/-
IJllJF, \'1ADE BARNEY, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 18974 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant, Lane Wade Barney, was charged by 
information with the sale of a controlled substance in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. (1953, as 58-3-8 
( 1) (a) (ii). 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried before a jury and convicted in 
the Sixth District Court in and for Sevier County, the 
Honorable Don v. Tibbs, presioing. Appellant was sentenced to 
serve not less than one nor more than fifteen years in the 
TJtah State Prison and fined Sl0,00(). Sentence and SS,000 of 
the fine were suspended and appellant was placed on probation 
provided he serve a one year term in the county jail, 
reviewable at the end of three months. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an order affirming the judgment of 
the lower court. 
STATF.MPNT OF THP FACTS 
On November 6, 1981, Officers RussP] 1 Spann an,l 
Kagie of the State Na rent ic anrl Liquor Law "'nf111 ccm0nt f11ll '',111 
were conduct in') an undercover cln1g invest iqat i11n. Tl1at 
evening at the Lil's rii ts Rar in R ichfi0l cl, l!tah, the off ic0rs 
were introduced to Michael Allred as interested drug buyers 
(T. 70, 'l4-95). During the ensuin'J conversation, Allred 
agreed to check around concerning the availability of dru9s 
(T. 70). Pursuant to that a')reement, Allred contacted Dave 
Jolley, a member of the band playing at the bar. Based on his 
conversation with Jolley, Allred reported to the undercover 
officers that cocaine would be available later in the evening 
for 5120.00 a gram. The unoercover officers then gave Allred 
$120.00 to make the purchase (T. 70-73). 
During the band's next break, Allred followed the 
band members to the parking lot where he approached appellant 
and purchased a gram of cocaine from him with the money 
received from the officers (T. 73-74). Allred then delivered 
the cocaine to Officer Spann (T. 74-75, 'l8) .1 
During cross-examination at appellant's trial, 
defense counsel asked Allred why he had approached appellant 
to make the drug purchase when Allred's earlier ne')otiations 
had all been with another band member, Dave Jolley. Allred 
stated that he sought out appellant "because I have got hi']h 
l Allred was later prosecuted for the sale. 
to plead guilty to a class A misdemeanor 
naming the person fr om whom he rurch ased 
testifying at his trial (T. 8!1-'lO) 
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He was allowecl 
in exchange for 
the cocaine and 
with Mr. Rarney before" (T. 83-84). Defense counsel objected 
to Allrerl's statement as prejudicial and moved for a mistrial. 
!'l1is !'lotion \Jas rlenierl (T. 113-ll'i). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
ALLRF:D' S STA'rEllF:NT WAS llOT A VIOLATim! OF 
RULE 55, UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE. 
Appellant contends a mistrial should have been 
granted based on Allred's response during cross-examination 
that he and appellant had previously "gotten high" together. 
Appellant argues this statement constitutes a violation of 
Rule 55, Utah Rules of Evidence. Rule 55 states: 
Subject to Rule 47 evidence that a person 
committed a crime or civil wrong on a 
specified occasion, is inadmissible to 
prove his disposition to commit crime or 
civil wrong as the basis for an inference 
that he committed another crime or civil 
wrong on another specified occasion but, 
subject to Rule 45 and 4R, such evidence 
is admissible when relevant to prove some 
other material fact including absence of 
mistake or accident, motive, opportunity 
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge or 
identity. 
The policy behind Rule 55 is to assure that a 
rlefendant is convicted for the charged crime and to prevent 
any conviction based on the defendant's character. State v. 
Tanner, Mo. 17742 (Utah, November 15, 1983). Respondent 
asserts that appellant's testimony with respect to "getting 
high" with appellant is not prohibited by Rule 55. It was 
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not offered to prove the matter's truth, t•10 "f'i>"lJ.1nt's 
character, nor the appellant's rlisposition to break thre Jaw. 
Moreover, this particular stnt0ment wcis nnt nar t nf the 
prosecution's case-in-chief. 
l\llrerl's iesponse was a sp0cific rcr•lv tn d••f0nsc· 
counsel's question rluring cross-examinatinn. 1'\l 1 red's 
testimony was userl by the State to show: (1) thnt there was a 
cocaine sale, and (2) that the cocaine was purchased from 
appellant. There is no evidence of an attempt by the 
prosecution to use Allred's reply during cross-examination to 
show that appellant either possessed a had character or was an 
habitual drug dealer. Furthermore, Allred's "getting high" 
reference is not synonymous 1vi th a prior conviction of another 
crime. Therefore, Allred's testimony was a direct response to 
defense counsel's questioning during cross-examination. 
Allred's statement was not only completely 
responsive to defense counsel's question hut also was useful 
to explain the circumstances surrounding the cocaine purchase. 
This Court has previously helrl that evidence relevant to 
explain the circumstances of a crime is admissible even though 
it might tenrl to connect the defennant with a prior wrong. 
State v. Daniels, Utah, 584 P.2d 880 (1978). See also: 
State v. Lopez, 22 !Jtah ;>rl 2S7, P.2d 772 (1969). 
Alger v. State, Okla. Cr., 603 P.2d 1154 (1980) 
arldressed the effect to he given a voluntary, tangential 
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remark by a witness. The rlefendant in Alger was on trial for 
taking indecent liberties with a minor. The victim's mother 
was callerl as a witness. During her testimony, in response to 
.i qu0stion, the witness made a general reference to "it having 
haprened before" with the defendant. Defense counsel argued 
that the statement was prejudicial. The court said: 
There is only an implication of another 
crime which is obvious only to defense 
counsel. To extend the protection of the 
rule to every possible implication which 
might be conceived by defense counsel is 
to extend the rule too far. Id. at 1156, 
quoting Burks v. State, Okla.--Cr., SnB 
p. 2d 3 2 2 ( 19 7 7 ) • 
Allred's statement parallels the type of statement at issue in 
Alger; a somewhat tangential remark made in response to a 
question. Appellant was given adequate opportunity to rebut 
Allred' s testimony and impeach Allred 's credibility. The jury 
weighed the conflicting testimony and rendered its verdict. 
There is absolutely nothing to indicate that the jury based 
its verdict on Allred's "getting high" statement. 
Appellant complains that he was prejudiced by 
Allred's testimony. Appellant fails to show, however, that 
Allred's statement was "unduly prejudicial". Even if it were 
determinea that Allred's statement was technically a violation 
of Rule 55, it was not sufficiently prejurlicial under the 
standards of Rules 4 and 45, Utah Rules of Evidence to warrant 
a mistrial. 
Rule 4, provides in pertinent part: 
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"A verdict shal 1 not he set as irlP, n•-n 
shall the judgment or rlecision liac;Pl 
thereon, hy reason of the erroneous 
admission of evidence unless . . the 
court which passes upon t\ie rf ff' ct ,,f the 
error or errors is of th'J or•in ion th,-it thr· 
arlmitte<1 evirlence shoulrl ha•10 IJ00n 
excluclerl on the ']t ounrls stated anrl 
probably had a substantial influNice 
in br1ng1ng about the verrlict or finding. 
(emphasis adrlerl.) 
Therefore, the defendant must some showing that the 
verclict was directly and substantially influenced by the 
challenged testimony "Under Rule 4, . an erroneous 
admission of evidence is treated as harmless error absent a 
showing that it had a substantial influence in hringinq about 
the verclict." State v. Utah, 649 P.2d 56, 59 
( 19 82). 
In State v. Creviston, Utah, 646 P.2d 750 (1982), 
the defendant was on trial for the sale of a controlled 
substance. In response to the prosecutor's question 
concerning the price of the cocaine, a police officer 
testified that the price was lower than usual because the 
defendant owed money to the State Narcotic and Provo Police 
Departments. The defendant objected to the remark as 
prejudicial and stated it woulcl cause the iury to perceive him 
as a regular drug dealer ancl hardened criminal. '!'his Court 
held, however, that the police officer's remark was not the 
type of statement which would be unrluly prejudical to the 
defendant. See al so: State v. Dodge, 12 !Jtah 2rl n3, 36S 
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A jury verdict shoulcl not he overturned in spite of 
error if it can be fairly concludecl that the error had no 
pr0juclicial effect on the complaining party. The verdict 
1,r,uld c,nly be overturned when the error is so substantial or 
l'l'']Uclicial that in its ahsence there would likely have been a 
different result. State v. Urias, Utah, 609 P.2d 1326 (1980). 
Rule 45 makes clear that the admission of evidence 
is cliscretionary with the trial court. The judge may choose 
to exclude evidence if he finds the risk that its aclmission 
will " ..• create substantial danger of undue prejudice." 
(emphasis addecl). Although a judge may exclude evidence, he 
should do so only after concluding that an injustice will 
result by its admission. This Court 
• court respects his prerogative in 
that regard and will not interfere with 
his ruling unless it clearly appears that 
he so abused his cliscretion that there is 
a likelihood that an injustice resulted. 
State v. Cankers, Utah, 599 P.2d 518, 520 
( 1979). 
This position was reiterated by the Court in State 
v. Mccardell, Utah, 652 P.2d 942 (1982) in which the Court 
stated that the issue was not whether the evidence created 
prejudice, but whether it created undue prejuclice. 
Furthermore, it is the function of the trial court to 
determine the prejudical effect of the admission. 
At the conclusion of the state's case, defense 
counsel movecl for a mistrial and was given the opportunity to 
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argue the prejudical effect of llllru!'s t<>sti·cnr1•.• t•1 ,1tid•JP 
Tibbs. The motion was denierl learlin') tn the infr:rer1<"» that 
the trial court wei']herl AllrPrl 's cil lcq<··l •tC' j1Hlieial sLttro·o• 11 1 
the testimony and founrl it insuffieiPntly 1•rc·1t1di,,1] I" 
warrant a mistrial. 
CONCLfJSION 
Allred's alleged prejurlicial remark is not 
prohibited by Rule 55 since it was not part of the statf''s 
case against appellant and was not offered by the State as 
ev ide nee of appellant 's bad character nor was it of fe rerl by 
the State to establish the truth of the matter. It was merely 
a response to defense counsel's question, and not a part of 
the prosecution's case-in-chief, 
Even if the statement were admitted in violation of 
Rule 55, its effect must be determined in accordance with the 
standards of Rule 4 and 45. These stanrlards require a showing 
of substantial or undue prejudice. The trial judge rletermines 
the possible prejudical effect and his rlecision shoulrl be 
overturnerl only if there has been a clear abuse of discretion. 
There has been no showing that the jury's verrlict 
was substantially influenced by Allred's remark, nor has it 
been reasonably established that there was a likelihoorl of ci 
different result in its absence. 
conviction should be sustainerl. 
-P,-
Therefore, appellant's 
RFSPECTFULLY submitted this of January, 
1 q R4. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
General 
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